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FAILURE OF LEGISLATURE TO ENACT SUITABLE CRIMINAL LAWS
The case of People v. Tom,kins, 79 Northeastern 326, Court of
Appeals of New York, forcibly illustrates a weakness in the gov-
ernmental system of that State which seems to amount to a failure
of justice. The same result might equally well occur in any of
our States, so that the trouble is not peculiar to any individual
State. The defendant represented himself as an agent of a tele-
graph company, by reason of which position he was able to ac-
quire,advance information on the results of certain horse races,
before the news was given out to the public. He induced the
complainant to bet $5o,ooo on a certain horse, named by the de-
fendant as the winner, but the information was entirely false, so
that complainant lost the entire amount to the defendant and his
confederates. The defendant was prosecuted on a charge of lar-
ceny by false pretences and convicted, but a motlon in arrest of
judgment was granted on the ground that the conviction was
contrary to previous decisions of the New York courts. What-
ever may have been the decision of the State courts, it seems
clear that the defendant was guilty of such fraud as to be punish-
able on the grounds of public policy, and the weight of authority
is in support of this view.
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The court in affirming the motion in arrest, although admitting
the soundness of the argument of the District Attorney for re-
versal, concluded that the law was settled in 187 by McfCord v.
People, 46 N. Y., 47o, and that it felt obliged to follow the prece-
dent. In that, case, one who fraudulently represented himself as an
officer of the law and as having a warrant for the arrest of a person,
induced him to give up valuable property, thus to avoid imprison-
ment. It was held that, although the motive of the appellant was
fraudulent, yet the complainant had parted with his property for an
illegal p arpose and the design of the statute was to protect those who
for honestpurposes only were induced by false representations to give
up their goods, and not to protect those whose object was unworthy
or illegal. This was merely an affirmation of a decision handed
down in I 83 7-People v. Clough, 4 Barb., in which case the reason of
the rule was questioned, and the result was admitted to be within
the words of the statute, but hardly within the spirit. The
court there said, "Does one who feeds a beggar, instead of or-
dering him from the house, participate in the crime of vagrancy?"
In the McCord case, supra, Peckham, J., framed an able dis-
senting opinion, stating that the statute was to be construed not
solely for the benefit of the party defrauded, but to punish a pub-
lic offence and to prevent fraud; that the illegal motive of the
party defrauded was secondary to and would not discharge the
offence committed by the one falsely obtaining the property. It
was clearly shown that where both parties to a civil suit are
equally guilty of a felony, out of which the action arises, the law
refuses its aid to either, but leaves them where it finds them.
But this rule has no application whatever to criminal proceedings,
because the party defrauded is no party to the action. The reason
of the rule fails since the people are prosecuting a public offence.
It is interesting to note that in goo, in People v. Livingston, 47
Appel. Div., 284, the court said: "We venture to suggest that
it might be wise for the Legislature to alter the rule laid down in
AMcCord v. People. If the rule as to larceny, by false pretences and
by trick or device, were made the same as the common law rule,
that stealing property from a thief is the same crime as stealing
from a true owner, we think this class of cases might be much
more successfully dealt with."
The result of our observation up to this point is a decision in
1837 which is admittedly enforcing the letter and not the spirit of
the statute; an affirmation of that doctrine in 187x, with a very
strong dissenting opinion; in xgoo a pointed suggestion by the
highest Court of the State to the Legislature that the law would
COMMENTS
be more serviceable and successful if modified; in 19o6 an opinion
which protects the criminal and allows him to go unmolested, be-
cause the statute has previously been adjudged inadequate to
meet his case, and the respect due to former decisions will not
permit a change.
The court said, 'Although it may be admitted that the rule
which exists only in New York and Wisconsin is at variance with
what now appears to be the more reasonable view adopted in at
least twelve of our sister States, and although it may be conceded
to be too narrow for the practical administration of criminal jus-
tice as applied to modern conditions, we are admonished that the
remedy is not with the courts, but in the legislature. We cannot
change the existing rule without enacting, in effect, an ex pos.
facto law. This cannot be done without ignoring the constitu-
tional rights of many who may legally claim the protection of the
rule. Neither can it be done without judicial usurpation of legis-
lative power."
In other States, there are several decisions which hold that the
right of the State to prosecute is not barred by the fact that the
motive of the person defrauded was illegal, the illegal act consti-
tuting him larticeps criminis. .People v. Martin, 102 Cal. 558; In re
Cummins, x6 Colo. 451; Casily v. State, 32 Ind. 62; State v. Walton,
114 N. C. 783.
The opinion of the court in the case under review leads us to a
consideration of the doctrine of stare decisis. The inadequacy of the
statute as passed by the legislature had been judicially admitted,
but no remedial action had been taken by the law-making body.
Judge Cooley, in his work on Constitutional Limitations, states
that the legislature and judiciary are co-ordinate departments of
the government and each is of equal dignity, within its own
sphere; the courts sit to enforce the legislative will, and only when
they find that the legislature has failed to keep within its consti-
tutional limits, are they at liberty to exercise the extremely deli-
cate function of disregarding its action.
In the principal case there are no grounds upon which the
enactment could be declared void, for no constitutional point was,
involved; the legislature had merely failed to enact measures
under which a by no means small class of criminals could be
prosecuted. If it is the duty of courts to enforce the legislative
will, the holding in this case is on principle impregnable, but the
fact still remains that either the reluctance of the Legislature is a
desire not to punish this class of lawbreakers, or the courts should
be allowed to adapt the law to the exigencies of the times. It
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would be presumptuous for us to say that the court should have
overthrown the doctrine stare dedsis, which, though repeatedly at-
tacked, has nevertheless become a very powerful factor in the de-
cisions of all courts. Indeed, the principle has had a remarkable
restraining influence on the ever-present impulse and desire to
change. It will be remembered that the statute had been in ex-
istence for nearly seventy years and was admittedly unfit to reach
the varieties of swindling operations which that period of time
had produced.
Nevertheless, the courts felt unable to adopt a modern rule
which would be sufficient for modern demands, and the result is
that this class of criminal cannot be punished until the Legislature
is disposed to enact sufficient measures to cover the crime.
LAWS REGULATING HOURS OF LABOR OF MINORS AND WOMEN.
CONSTITUTIONALITY
One can scarcely conceive of the extent to which the ever
growing spirit of commercialism has stealthily pervaded the var-
ious institutions of our country. Struggling humanity, weak and
helpless before the sordid desire of the few to gain at the expense
of the many, has voiced its own protection through the law-mak-
ing powers of several States. Moved by the desire for the welfare,
comfort and health of the community-for surely a State legis-
lature could be impelled by no smaller motive in such cases-acts
have been passed, by virtue of the police power in them vested,
regulating hours of employment of minors and women. And it
must come with no small sense of surprise and regret to the
many-surprise at the heartless attitude of the court in such
matters, regret because of their fruitless effort to secure a little
longer lease of life-that the highest court of our leading State
should declare a law regulating the hours of labor of minors and
women, to be an attempt ''to arbitrarily prevent an adult female
citizen from working at any time of the day that suits her," and
"an infringement on her constitutional liberty to contract." In
enacting such laws, legislatures are moved by no mawkish maud-
lin sentiment, nor do they wish to arbitrarily interfere with indi-
vidual rights, or make unjust discriminations. Their desire is to
protect the health and safety not only of the weaker citizens of the
state but also of the unborn generations and the court of greatest
dignity of such a State should, indeed, be slow to attribute to such
action a motive less commendable, and to condemn as unconsti-
tutional so salutary a measure.
In the recent case of People v. Williams, 8x N. E. (N. Y. ) 778,
COMMENTS
the defendant was convicted of violating the labor law of the State
of New York. The section of the statute on which the in formation
was based, reads that: "No minor under the age of eighteen
years, and no female shall be employed, permitted or suffered to
work in any factory in this State before six o'clock in the morning,
or after nine o'clock in the evening of any day; or for more than
ten hours in any one day except to make a shorter work day on
the last day of the week; or for more than sixty hours in any one
week or more hours in any one week than will make an average
of ten hours a day for the whole number of days so worked."
The defendant, though found guilty, was discharged, in the
lowest court, on a motion in arrest of judgement, the court holding
that the legislative enactment was unconstitutional. This decis-
ion was affirmed on every appeal taken in the case, the appellate
court so holding because it was of the opinion that such a statute
was not a valid exercise of the police power but an infringement
on the constitutional liberty to contract.
The principal objection to such a regulation is that it violates
that provision of the constitution which declares that "no person
shall be deprived of life, liberty or property without due process
of law." The Illinois Supreme Court has declared such a
provision unconstitutional on these grounds. The words "no
female shall be employed" were construed to prohibit any manu-
facturer, etc., from contracting to employ, and every female from
contracting to be employed, otherwise then provided for by
statute. So that the right of both to contract in regard to such
matters was limited and restricted. The right to contract is both
a liberty and a property right. The attributes of property include
not only the right to acquire, possess and protect the same, but
also to make reasonable contracts in regard thereto, and the latter
right is as muci within the guaranty of the constitution as the
former. Labor is property and the right to labor and employ
labor are both protected by the constitution. Woman, being a
citizen, may acquire and possess any kind of property, and being
a "person" may claim the benefit of the constitutional provision.
Thus is she guaranteed the right to make and enforce contracts.
Ritchie v. The People, x55 Ill. 98.
The Illinois court, however, refuses to see any reasonable
ground for the use by the legislature of its police power, and dis-
misses the idea in a very feeble attempt to show that such exer-
cise of the police power is unreasonable. The State has always
considered women and children as its wards to a greater or less
extent. And although woman has been freed from a great many
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of her common-law disabilities, she has not yet acquired a position
equal to that of man. She is physically unable to stand the same
hours of exhaustive labor that man is. Certain kinds of labor that
might be performed by man with no evil results would soon ren.
der woman a physical wreck and reduce her to a condition in
which she would be unable to bear her share of the family duties
and household burdens. The State watches over its wards. and
rightfully protects womankind, as a class, against such acondition.
Wenham v. State, 65 Neb. 394. And as said by the Supreme Court
of the State of Washington, "it must logically follow that that
which deleteriously affects any great number of women who are
the mothers of succeeding generations must necessarly affect the
public welfare and the public morals." State v. Buchanan, 29
Wash. 602. Moreover, as the field of labor in which woman may
engage is small and competition necessarily very great, the em-
ployer has such an advantage over them that they would be sub-
ject to such hardships and exactions, that the protection of the
law must'necessarily be invoked. Wenham v. State, supra. So the
effect of such a law is not to destroy the right to contract but to
reasonably regulate such right as it relates to the labor of women.
Such a law does not exceed the reasonable exercise of the police
power and is not unconstitutional. Wenham v. State, supra.
Again it is urged that such legislation is unconstitutional in
that it denies to such persons the equal protection of the laws.
It takes from the employers privileges which are allowed to other
persons under the same conditions. These particular employers
are prohibited from contracting as formerly they have done and
as others are still allowed to do (the prohibition is generally lim-
ited to some one class of manufacturers, etc.). Such individuals
are singled out of a class and burdens imposed on them that are
not imposed on others of the class. In other words, it amounts to
class legislation, the classification being arbitrary and unreason-
able. Ritchie v. People, supra. Such would be a valid objection if
both the employer and employee were adult males. In such a
case they would be on an equal footing. But such is not the case
when the employees are women or children, as was observed
above. And so "the State must be accorded the right to guard
and protect women, as a class, against such a condition, and the
law in question to that extent conserves the public health and
welfare." Wenham v. State, supra.
Finally it is contended that such a law is unconstitutional as
it impairs the obligations of contract. In the case of Common-
wealth v. H-amilton Manufacturing Company, io Mass. 383, the de-
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fendant company set up as a defence to a prosecution for the
violation of a statute similar to that in the recent case, that its act
of incorporation was a contract with the commonwealth, and that
such a statute impaired the obligations thereof; that the legal
capacity to contract for all labor necessary to carry on such a bus-
iness was conferred by necessary implication by an act of incor-
poration to manufacture cotton and woolen goods. The court,
however, held that the fullest extent to which the company could
contract for labor was for all lawful labor only; that it could not
contract for such labor as forbidden by law; nor was it agreed that
such laws as the public welfare should thereafter demand would
not be passed. So no obligation of the contract with the defend.
ant is violated by the enactment of such laws in the performance
of a constitutional duty to protect the public.
While what few authorities there are are in direct conflict on
the question, and while neither can be said to constitute the
weight of authority, yet it would seem that the more humane view
would favor the constitutionality of such legislation. The exer-
cise, by the legislature, of its police power is clearly proper in such
cases. Until the recent New York decision, Illinois alone held
such legislation unconstitutional. Both decisions avoid the real
issue by ignoring the main question, that is, the inability of
woman and the protection afforded her by such exercise of the
police power. "An adult female is not to be regarded in any
other light than the man is regarded when the question relates to
business pursuit or calling," says the New York court. This courtis
"calling a halt" which the welfare, comfort and health of society
is clearly opposed to. And it is hardly to be feared that such a
precedent will obtain a very great following. Yet the decision is
interesting in that it shows the tendency of the times and should
be a warning against certain influences which the public welfare
demands should be checked.
